Apart from that chapter, he has outlined the implications of that stance in several articles: Brigadier Justin Kelly and Dr. Michael James Brerman, Alien: Strate- gic Studies Institute, U. Army War College, Zhaldybm, and Cap- tain 1st Rank V. Yale University Press, Geo-Strategy, Geopolitics and New Governance: Current Trends, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.
But the deeper and longer one looks at it and at the debate preceding its adoption, a rather different, indeed much more anxious document and government emerge. Not only are fundamental issues unresolved, but also a strong debate over its issues and overall approach continues. Moreover, the debate preceding its adoption revealed many of the inher- ent defects of Russia's political structure.
Meanwhile, the document itself and the debate leading to it are riddled with unresolved contradictions. These facts should not surprise us because such documents are always inherently political documents, and no society is immune from political contestation. However, the contradictions revealed in this process raise serious questions concerning the nature of the Russian policy process and Russia's national security strategy.
The concept of security still lacks a universally agreed upon definition. Therefore, it must necessar- ily be a contested concept among practical politicians who must deal with the concept in its tangible mani- festations. Certainly this is true in Russia as elsewhere. Russian debates have continued for a long time because they have huge political repercus- sions, given the strength of the state and the global scope of its international and national activity.
These debates are also important not only because they of- fer us a window into a very opaque political process, but also because — at least rhetorically — Russian elites attach great policy importance to such doctrinal docu- ments. Therefore, these debates possess more than aca- demic significance.
In Russian debates, whoever can define the nature and scope of security i. He also obtains both the tangible and intangible political resources with which to enrich his constituents and himself and to execute missions. Russia's new security strategy and the supposedly forthcoming defense doctrine have had a long and difficult gestation. Clearly many obstacles to announcing a new strategy had emerged. Indeed, in the Secretary of the Security Council, 20 Igor Ivanov, said that the council was working on a new national security concept. According to Vitaly Shlykov, Chairman of the Public Council un- der the Ministry of Defense, at the end of neither the General Staff nor the Ministry had the resources to prepare a defense doctrine, nor was the factual ma- terial submitted after years of work sufficient.
Neither was there an announcement of the as- signment to them of such resources or of what those resources might be. Obviously Shlykov' s explanation cries out for interpretation and probably concealed the real reason for delay most probably unresolved pol- icy debates. For example, it was silent about the role of the Security Council, which is nominally supposed to prepare these documents. Therefore, to obtain a better grasp of the dynamics of national security and national security policymaking in the Russian Federa- tion, we must trace this struggle over the national se- curity strategy and then analyze it.
In so doing, we can discern at least the outlines, if not more, of the debate from events in , if not earlier. Baluyevsky and others that the General Staff and the Ministry had finished their work and submitted it to the Security Council, Shlykov's announcement confirmed that no secu- rity strategy was possible, given the ongoing discord among the main players. Gareyev, represented the Academy and the General Staff's rejection of Ivanov's and the Duma's efforts to codify either a national security concept or relevant legislation.
Gareyev claimed in June that a de- fense doctrine largely drafted by his institute would be ready by the end of , and that while there were many debates that needed to be clarified and resolved in the process. The Russian Defense Act and the Na- tional Security blueprint presumably that Ivanov was working on "are of a lecture and unduly theoretical nature. Gareyev thus revealed that his institution, which works for the General Staff, had essentially usurped the Security Council's role and work, and was trying to publish a defense doctrine in advance of the Coun- cil's overall National Security Strategy.
This repeated the General Staff's effort to do the same thing and enshrine itself rather than the government 22 as the arbiter of both the assessment of threats to Rus- sia and of the recommended policies to counter them. Indeed, Russian commentators wrote then that, "there is no unity of views on the content of the [military] reforms or of the doctrine. There is only a kind of ferment of minds and ambitions. Thus, this issue identifies a hitherto underestimated example of an abiding and unsolved problem in Russian civil-military relations.
Even though the General Staff has lost consistently for the last 5 years, it does not stop trying to impose its views upon the government. There still is no regularized, binding, and le- gally codified policymaking process or official consen- sus for defining security, threats, or any other defense policy that is established by law or regular institu- tions. Or if there are relevant laws, nobody pays them any serious attention.
Rather, an ongoing and repeti- tive conflict takes place between the Ministry of De- fense and the General Staff regardless of precedent or personalities. Given the absence of the rule of law in the government and state, it is hardly surprising that policymaking remains personalized, haphazard, frag- mented, and subject to endless and often inconclusive struggles. Neither should we be surprised that the 23 Russian state is deficient in the means of conducting a true national strategy.
After all, analysts like Dmitry Trenin of the Carnegie Endowment have publicly said that the Russian state still cannot conduct a true stra- tegic policy and lacks the means for doing so. Alternatively the government, as numerous foreign and domestic ana- lysts regularly charge, has long since been captured by elements that use it essentially as an instrument for the pursuit of private, departmental, or factional aims.
Consequently, there is no real concept of the national interest, let alone a coherent national strategy for security or anything else. Although Putin personally articulated a threat assessment and defini- tion of security in through his speeches, state- ments, and press conferences, the government visibly lost the ability to do so through Possibly this is why the government lost that capability, or else Putin had to do it because nobody else could. Ultimately, then, threat assessment and the definition of what is- sues make up the composition of "national security" is or will be what Putin, or his successor.
And as we shall see, Putin embraced the defense establishment and intelligence agencies' assessment, and this assessment has prevailed since , even though it is a grossly exaggerated and patently self-serving assessment that also begins with a presumption of conflict and Russia's isolation. Accordingly, the new national security strategy and a new defense doctrine became visible objects of intense political struggle long before , and that struggle has continued into the present. Normally a national security strategy should precede both a de- fense and a foreign policy doctrine or concept.
Instead, the foreign policy concept appeared in July and was followed in by the national security strate- gy. Even if one argues that the foreign policy concept expressed the ideas and values of the subsequent na- tional security strategy as apparently is the case , this is an unusual procedure. Just as publishing a defense doctrine avant la lettre suggests an effort to impose a defense policy upon the government, so too does this suggest an attempt to impose a foreign policy even be- fore the dust had settled on the debates over national security.
Thus, these political events and competing per- spectives testify to the battle over the national secu- rity strategy and the defense doctrine. The latter still awaited release as of August , but Russia's Na- tional Security Council received it for consideration in Thus the current debate has deep roots. This is another ex- ample of the Russian argument that its borders really are the Soviet ones, for Iraq is quite far from the Russian Federation and was not even adjacent to the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- lics [USSR], but the standard argument was and is that the Middle East is a region adjacent to Russia.
So we see here another example of the inability to come to terms with post trends. Beyond that point, Tyushkevich intro- duced an idea that has since moved to the heart of Russian national security discourse, namely that due to U. There has been neither a buildup of forces near Russia nor any deployment of nuclear weapons anywhere near Russia. The constancy of such accusations is another ex- ample of the consistent and clearly deliberate disin- formation of the Russian government by its military and intelligence agencies, a fundamental outgrowth of the failure to control these agencies after by civilian and democratic means.
This second failure in civil-military relations has profound consequences for Russia's security. As Pavel Felgenhauer, a leading de- fense correspondent, reports.
Through the GRU, the General Staff controls the supply of vital information to all other decision- makers in all matters concerning defense pro- curement, threat assessment, and so on. High- ranking former GRU officers have told me that in Soviet times the General Staff used the GRU to grossly, deliberately, and constantly mislead the Kremlin about the magnitude and gravity of the military threat posed by the West in order to help inflate military expenditure.
There are serious indications that at present the same foul practice is continuing. Although the regime did not buy the latter part of his argument concerning military force as Rus- sia's sole or primary factor confirming its status and independence, it did buy this threat assessment. As we shall see, subsequent assessments argue that the United States is bringing ever more military force and conflict closer to Russia's borders, which are very ex- pansively defined, and that it is increasing military and especially nuclear pressure on Russia and even bringing nuclear weapons closer to Russia.
Moreover, according to these assessments, attempts to interfere in Russia's internal life and that of its partners — i. Terrorism was downgraded as a threat in the face of this Western onslaught. Yet, the evidence for it is lacking. Even if NATO enlarges, its forces have not done so and, if anything, have shown their declining capability for and interest in war with Russia. Even the General Staff has admit- ted that 10 radars and interceptors in Poland and the Czech Republic cannot threaten Russia's deterrent for all their anger over missile defense.
For the military, it justifies big mili- tary spending on a big army, navy, and air force, not to mention nuclear weapons.
While for the political elite, as many commentators have noticed, this assessment justifies an ongoing domestic concentration of power as well as the rhetoric and policy of neo-imperialism in the CIS. So because of its political utility to diverse audiences, it is hardly surprising that as time passed, this alarmist threat assessment became more perva- sive, more expansive, and even more alarmist. Ozerov, however, emphasized that military strength is not the key determinant of na- tional power in the system of international relations.
Instead, he advanced a new idea that also would soon find favor and ratification in subsequent debates: The new geopolitics are based, as a rule, on the idea of "indirect wars" or "indirect influence. Nevertheless, military threats were present and could still break out in the RFE. Indeed, he warned that Russia "could be susceptible to the impact of a most diverse spectrum of threat emanating both from external and internal sources here.
All of these are exacerbated by the ideology of double standards, propaganda, and a dis- tortion of the Russian state's principles of democracy. That policy could also come to entail direct military intervention, but clearly is subsumed under the Rus- sian understanding of information warfare IW. In that understanding, IW in foreign hands represents a threat to the integrity of the state and government. Those symptoms lead to an inconsistent foreign policy and an equally unsustainable approach to the problems of military organization.
Since then, he has advocated that national security doctrine actu- ally incorporate the defense doctrine into itself, fusing the two documents into one and militarizing them at the same time, and also challenging the government's primacy in this sphere. In Janu- ary, Baluyevsky further expanded this assessment. According to him, we are now seeing i. In- deed, given Russian state support for the Rus- sian mafia abroad and for such characters as the notorious arms seller Viktor Bout, one wonders where Baluyevsky got his evidence.
Even though he admitted that there was little chance of direct military aggression against Russia, he said new threats persist and in some areas even esca- late. In other words, not content with listing the same threats as Ozerov and Tyushkevich, he added another key point in the burgeoning inflation of threats and securitization of domestic affairs, namely that Rus- sia's security environment was deteriorating despite its recovery, and that threats involving the use of force were more likely even though there is no evidence to sustain that argument.
Nonetheless, as we shall see, this line of argument has prevailed since then. Thus, even before leaks of a prospective new defense doc- trine in that made clear the erasure of boundaries between internal and external security, i. The process described here exemplifies this lamentable trend. Baluyevsky's list of threats clearly not only derives from, but also expands upon previous lists. Thus, in Baluyevsky's analysis the threats are: He duly added to the notion that Russia is under comprehensive internal and external threats to which the military must address itself and which demand a defense policy response.
After publication of this article by Baluyevsky, the scope for threat as- sessments became both larger and more pervasive in 34 the sense that he and others now adopted his line and developed it further. Indeed, he kept up the attack, continuing to define the threats to Russia in this way between and Like innumerable other Russian publications, it postulated Russia's recovery from its crisis of the s and that the U.
Accordingly, the contemporary military scene is characterized by a significant lowering of the threat of large-scale conventional war and nuclear war; the increased use of the military in peace operations; the emergence of new centers of economic power like Germany, China, and Japan; the expansion of poten- tial crisis areas and the increased level of regional con- flict in the area from the Balkans to Central Asia based on ethnicity, faith, and crime; terrorism; a renewed arms race with the danger of proliferation of WMD and other types of weapons; and NATO enlargement.
Politically, we see increasing encroachment upon states' sovereignty, rising influence of multinational corporations, extremism based on religion, terrorism based on organized extremism, organized crime, etc. In this connection, daily attacks are made according to two criteria: Thus this threat of the Russian Federation be- ing under information attack on a permanent basis entered into Russian thinking by Indeed, Gareyev advo- cated the creation of a, separate, independent directorate, as part of the Presi- dential Staff of the Russian government that would be entrusted with coordinating information activity on a countrywide level— from intellectual security, the development of a national idea and shaping Rus- sia's favorable image abroad to countering all types of subversive activity, including the ideological support and organization of "color," "velvet", and other sorts of revolutions.
Thus, by , it was clear that Moscow was look- ing at IW both as a threat and as an opportunity to wage the kinds of new wars its analysts were depict- ing even before it did so in Estonia in Deputy Premier and former Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov indicated Moscow's full awareness of the kinds of ac- tivity it was launching in Estonia and that it was a sur- rogate for a more classical military kind of operation.
It is a weapon that allows us to carry out would-be military actions in practically any theater of war and most importantly, without using military power. That is why we have to take all the necessary steps to develop, improve, and, if necessary - and it already seems to be necessary - develop new multi- purpose automatic control systems, so that in the fu- ture we do not find ourselves left with nothing. Furthermore, leading Russian military figures like Baluyevsky and Gareyev openly discussed threats to Russia in which the country might suffer even a crush- ing defeat without a shot being fired.
The breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the parade of "color revolutions" in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, and so on show how principal threats ex- ist objectively, assuming not so much military forms as direct or indirect forms of political, diplomatic, eco- nomic, and informational pressure, subversive activi- ties, and interference in internal affairs.
The RF's [Russian Federation] security interests require not only that such threats be assessed, but also that effec- tive measures of countering them be identified. These trends illustrated another key development in the new security strategy that was already identified by in the debate leading up to its publication. Whereas the earlier doctrinal statements listed many of the same military threats but separated the nonmilitary ones from the military ones, the IW threat was a new one. As the Dutch analyst Colonel Marcel de Haas of the Royal Netherlands Air Force observed at the time; But the evolving international security situation shows that this division of threats and measures is becoming blurred.
This prompts the conclusion that either the military doctrine should cover threats in all fields that is, both military and non-military security threats , or the doctrine and the National Security Concept should be combined into one document, which might be called a defense doctrine or a security doctrine. The new military doctrine acknowledges that it's no longer justifiable to draw a line between internal and exter- nal security, or military and non-military threats and countermeasures.
In general this should be appreciat- ed. Like doctrine specialists in the West, their Russian counterparts now regard security as covering all areas and dimensions. More- over, they sought a doctrine that would link internal and external security in ways that clearly enhanced the role of the General Staff as a director of Russia's overall security policy. They made this effort at the January conference of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences where Baluyevsky and Gareyev dominated the proceedings.
At this meeting, Gareyev and Baluyevsky made a strong effort to take over the doctrine process on behalf of the General Staff. Bal- uyevsky again emphasized the growing threat from NATO enlargement and that it is falsely we might add involved with local conflicts near Russia's bor- ders. Meanwhile, Gareyev emphasized the general threat to Russia's sovereignty and interests, politically based IW, the threat to energy security, and missile de- fenses. Both argued that the presence of large military powers and contingents near Russian borders created a threat of the start of armed conflicts all the way up to large-scale wars, particularly to Russia's South and East.
We see here how securitization and politicization of those processes, the attempt to use issues labeled as pertaining to security for directly political purposes and advantages, could easily run amok in Russian pol- itics due to the failure to institute effective democratic controls over the government, armed forces, and spe- cial services to use the Russian term.
Here the crucial difference with the West is that this concept of security has been politicized to the point where threats are seen as ubiquitous, and has been used to produce the intel- lectual justification for further authoritarianism. And, as we shall see, the new national security strategy ac- cepted this concept of security and the accompanying politicization and securitization processes linked to it. As the debate progressed, in early Baluyevsky publicly fulminated against U.
Erom today's vantage point, however, it is clear who prevailed, at least until now. Despite these ad- monitions concerning Russia's economic vulnerabil- ity, the need for reform to include security policy, and the fact that severe economic crisis is crippling Rus- sia's capabilities, Moscow's tough rhetoric and poli- cies have, if anything, intensified, making it difficult to discern any sign of a qualitative change in policy.
Bush administration complained that Russian policy remains " inflexible. Meanwhile during , Putin also took upon himself to outline a threat assess- ment in a series of major speeches not just the Munich speech of Putin's litany of grievances in speech- es going back to specified Russia's complaints in greater detail. It has therefore become impossible to find solutions to conflicts in other words, American unilater- alism actually makes it harder to end the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan— hardly an incon- testable proposition. Because America seeks to decide all issues unilaterally to suit its own interests in disregard of others, "no one feels safe," and this policy stimulates an arms race and proliferation of WMD.
Here Putin cited Russia's example of a peaceful transition to democracy! Of course, Russia hardly has a spotless record with regard to nonintervention, as Estonia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia illustrate. America is also creating new destabilizing high-tech weapons, including space weapons. In regard to this program, Putin replied to a question at the Wehrkunde Conference in by saying that.
The United States is actively developing and already strengthening an anti-missile defense system. Today this system is ineffective but we do not know exactly whether it will one day be effective. But in theory it is being created for that purpose. So hypothetically we recognize that when this moment arrives, the possible threat from our nuclear forces will be completely neu- tralized. Russia's present capabilities, that is. The bal- ance of powers will be absolutely destroyed and one of the parties will benefit from the feeling of complete security.
That means that its hands will be free not only in local but eventually also in global conflicts. Moreover, Baluyevsky and the General Staff all regu- larly argued that because there is allegedly no threat from Iran, these missile defenses can only be aimed at Russia and at threatening to neutralize its deterrent.
Nevertheless, the role of the armed forces and intelligence services in promoting this expansive threat assessment is incon- testable. As Secretary of Defense Gates no stranger to the world of intelligence recently observed, [Prime Minister Putin] basically dismissed the idea that the Iranians would have a missile that would have the range to reach much of Western Europe and much of Russia before or so.
And he showed me a map that his intelligence guys had prepared. I told him he needed a new intelligence service. The fact of the matter is, the Russians have come back to us and 44 acknowledged that we were right in terms of the near- ness of the Iranian missile threat, and that they had been wrong. And so my hope is we can build on that. Thus, revolutions in CIS countries are fomented from abroad, and elections there often are masquer- ades whereby the West intervenes in their in- ternal affairs. If we juxtapose Putin's assessment against the oth- ers presented here, the congruence, overlap, and even identity of these threat assessments becomes very clear.
This debate is revealing in many other ways as well. It confirms that Russian discussions of 45 security are no longer confined to defense, and that the meaning of the term security had been greatly am- plified over the preceding generation as in the West and even China. But that amplification has taken its own unique, even idiosyncratic, course. While Rus- sia has followed Western examples in talking about common and comprehensive security and in thinking about its own security in those amplified terms, it also sees an enormous range of subjects as constituting the elements that comprise national security and consid- ers them as fit subjects for state leadership if not con- trol.
In other words a process of securitization on a grand political scale has occurred even as defense is- sues no longer have sole pride of place in official Rus- sian discourse. As Sergei Rogov, Director of the USA and Canada Institute, observed, "Over here, when the Russian Federation's Security Council was set up, we adopted an all-embracing definition of security that stipulated the security of the individual, society, and state from external and internal threats in all spheres of vital activity.
And this process, in the absence of democratic reform to establish true democratic controls over the security sector, has allowed the military and the government to extend the securitization process, and allowed the military to concern itself with defining nonmilitary as well as military threats and argue for a role in policymaking towards them.
Indeed, Felgen- gauer wrote that the military actively sought the right to use its forces, not the Ministry of Interior's Internal Troops VVMVD , to quell domestic unrest should it break out. To the extent that they were or are successful and the issue in ques- tion comes to be conceived of as referring to or posing a threat to the state, it has not only been politicized, but securitized, i.
Political actors who first politicize an issue as a threat to security and then securitize it, aim to persuade relevant audiences, in this case the political and military elite, that the issue in question poses an "existential threat to the country, either to its territory, the integrity of the state, its group identity, its environment, or its economic interests.
Securitization thus denotes political actors' efforts, most often, though not exclusively, through speech or discourse, to take an issue out of normal politics and bring it into the realm of security. This process subordinates the issue to the competence of security organs, removes it from the public realm, substitutes secret bureaucratic decisions for open politics, and of- ten contravenes human or civil rights.
If and when the content of the se- curity "speech act" is acknowledged as legitimate by a significant "audience," the issue in question has become successfully "securitized. In the Russian context, this all-encompassing securitiza- tion aimed not only to make the military the supreme arbiter of national defense, but also to provide an equally wide-ranging threat assessment based on the presupposition of enemies everywhere and pervasive threats to Russia's government, identity, territory, and economy.
As we noted above, by the Gen- eral Staff's Academy of Military Science, led by Gar- eyev, presented a comprehensive threat assessment embracing all those domains and the threat of IW that supposedly justified militarizing the entire state struc- ture and making the Minister of Defense the Deputy Commander in Chief in both peacetime and wartime over a vastly strengthened government that would re- store a Ministry of Defense Industry and prepare for Russia's comprehensive mobilization.
The government adopted almost all of the assessment that Gareyev presented in but has consistently re- jected his moves to militarize the country and enforce a mobilization economy. That is, it has refused to give the military control over the country or something close to it in peacetime, let alone in wartime.
So while we have a threat assessment that presupposes conflict all around and even within Russia, the government either cannot or will not adopt policies that move completely in the direction of that logic. This result highlights the fact that the military as defined here is successful in embedding its threat perception among key elites only to the degree that they are receptive to it in advance, i. In this respect, "The fate of securitizing moves is to a large degree determined by external factors such as their embeddedness, or lack thereof in social relations of power.
In , for example. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, adopting the logic of all-encompassing and wide-ranging threats, said that the armed forces must be capable of operating in several regional and local conflicts simultaneously, a demand that is in no way possible unless one resorts to full-scale mobiliza- tion or the threat of nuclear war.
Another way to state this is that despite its am- bitions and the expansiveness of its threat perception, Russia cannot sustain either the magnitude of what its elites want to build or deal effectively with the real as opposed to notional threats confronting it. Caught be- tween grandiose ends and perceived threats which are to some degree politically manufactured, Russia has not developed sufficient means to meet either existing or notional threats.
Consequently its political and eco- nomic demands upon its own society and the world cannot be sustained, but it cannot desist from making those demands and thus creating a fundamentally un- tenable security situation in Eurasia. The threat assessment that has prevailed looks to wars with the United States and NATO, yet the current defense reform clearly points to an army capable of waging the smaller wars that prevail in our time and becoming more of an expe- ditionary force for Russia's and the CIS' peripheries.
Anatoly Tsyganok, Head of the Center for Military Forecasting, expressed this concept of future war and of a defense for it in , even as Gareyev and Bal- uyevsky were calling for something more traditional. We believe that in the 21st century, a guerilla war is more likely than a war launched by a modern army of, shall we say, the European or Asian type. Therefore the arms and equipment must be prepared for that type of war. Unfortunately our military hardware that currently exists is last-century hardware. Gareyev, by forecasting the possibility of wars across much of the so-called spectrum of conflict, proposed something very different from Tsyganok' s analysis.
Indeed, this article reported that the draft defense doctrine was proposing to change the doctrine's statement that the development of the Armed Forces had to be carried out on the basis of Russia's economic potential to language indicating that the economy had to pro- vide for the armed forces' development at any price, i. Indeed, this debate showed that, as of the government, while admittedly engrossed in tak- ing ever more aspects of national security under its control, could not formulate or implement a coherent program attuned to the goal of enhancing national security under any definition.
His remarks belied the care- fully polished image of the Russian state under Pu- tin as some kind of relentless, coherent juggernaut or machine though its powers for striking fear are more than ample. Thus for all of the supposed advances made under Putin that allegedly unified policymak- ing, it turns out, not surprisingly to students of Rus- sia's political folkways, that this was not the case and that policy division and internecine struggles were rampant.
And in the light of Russian history those remarks highlighted the continuity of Putinism with Russia's past.
THE RUSSIAN MILITARY TODAY AND. TOMORROW: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF MARY FITZGERALD. Stephen J. Blank. Richard Weitz. Editors. The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of the magnitude of Mary Fitzgerald's enlightening accomplishments in this.
Certain conclusions suggest themselves. First, as noted above and in advance of the publication of the defense doctrine, it appears that despite Medvedev's elevation to the presidency, he, Kudrin, and Chubais lost the battle to define the threat assessment and the ensuing policy requirements dictated by that assess- ment to ensure Russian security. Second, the visible trend under Putin to securitize ever more areas of Russian socio-economic and political life continues to be in the ascendancy with significant consequences for 51 both domestic and foreign policies. Third, this trend has led to an aggressive military campaign to seize the initiative in defining the threats confronting Rus- sia and the policies it should therefore adopt.
These policy conclusions preceded the Russo-Georgian war in August , so they are not exclusively attribut- able to that war and its aftermath. Indeed, both the debate and the war can be traced to developments within the Russian policy process that go far beyond Moscow's problems with Tbilisi. At the same time, the importance of economics has reasserted itself with a vengeance not just in real life but in the national secu- rity strategy as well, making economic issues subject to greater securitization than before.
As a result, Pu- tin and now President Medvedev have presided over, if not championed, the further securitization of ever more areas of national policy. And this securitization process has allowed the military to take an aggressive posture on defining threats and recommended policy responses to them. Furthermore, President Medvedev if not Putin has consciously used the new strategy to try to impose coherence on the government and policy, a highly traditional Russian approach.
And, of course, that self-conscious attempt to use this process and the new strategy for those purposes is another piece of evidence for the existence of a preceding tough politi- cal struggle. As we noted, while the military-intelligence bloc's assessment was largely accepted because it co- incided with the political leadership's outlook, the response to that assessment proffered by the Siloviki was rejected in favor of a civilian-led program of ac- tion.
Nevertheless, the net result is the securitization and politicization of ever more aspects of domestic politics. Consequently, the national security strategy serves primarily domestic political and strategic pur- poses, starting with the goal of imposing order upon this debate. Thus we see the following developments occurring with regard to Russia's overall national se- curity policy. The Security Council's authority has fluctuated widely, depending almost exclusively on who ran it, and it was used for political and military figures that had been removed from the active policy struggle.
It exemplified the irregular, personalized world of Russian policymaking. Now the Council's Secretary, Nikolai Patru- shev, former Director of the Federal Security Service FSB , is to oversee the Council's coor- dinating role that covers all elements of the na- tional security system and beyond that organs of state government, state organizations, and social organizations. It is also another sign of the obsession with having a concentra- tion of power in one supposedly centralized organ that will thus overcome all the defects of Russian governance.
This is a long-standing but inherently unrealizable fantasy of Russian autocrats and officials. Indeed, we have seen similar trends in the de- fense industrial sector indicating that Russia is reverting to an ever more Soviet or at least Tsarist-like defense industrial structure that will be even less transparent than before. This security strategy points to the diffusion of this mode of thinking throughout the government.
In the case of the defense industry, this trend was visible by Conforming to the Russian tradition that an effort to root out inefficiencies and ineffectiveness often involves more cen- tralization, that then entails the creation of ever more auditing and inspecting agencies to per- form those regulatory functions summed up in kontrol, Deputy Prime Minister and head of the defense industry Sergei Ivanov had created by then what one writer called an audit pyramid under his supervision in the military industrial complex MIC.
The Coun- cil will be the body measuring progress by all concerned parties on implementing the new strategy, reporting annually to the President. This provision indicates the regime's intention of centralizing all of these kontrol functions in that body. With this document President Medve- dev, if not Putin, has explicitly stated his inten- tion to use the strategy and what he calls stra- tegic planning as an instrument of control in our sense of the word to overcome the domi- nance of departmentalism and departmental priorities over national interest the besetting vice of all Russian bureaucracy from time im- memorial.
This determination was proclaimed well before the document itself was released, indicating that this is a real priority for its au- thors if not President Medvedev and Putin. Thus Patrushev stated in December that, "On the whole, the country's leadership has already mapped out the first priority aspects of the national security strategy, which are the perfection of the political system, optimization of state governance and the enhancement of the state's defense and security capabilities.
This lack of governmental coherence is pervasive. For instance, it is visible in the fact that while the Ministry of Defense is vigorously pushing a new and controversial reform, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is generally acknowledged not to be the main source of foreign policy initia- tives, while the Ministry of Trade and Develop- ment has long been disinclined to engage in in- dependent thinking.
At the key meeting on the security strategy of March 24, , the Security Council's Press Office reiter- ated Patrushev's point, "The strategy is aimed at increasing the quality of public administra- tion and is intended to coordinate the efforts of the authorities and governmental and public organizations to protect Russia's national in- terests and to ensure, individual, public, and national security.
It links together "the activities of the executive organs of the government and the state, corporative, and social organizations in the protection of the national interests of Rus- sia and the provision of security for the indi- vidual, the public, and the state. This docu- ment and the others surrounding it represent an attempt to silence debate and coordinate the state. As Patrushev told an interviewer, "Most importantly, it is aimed at improving the quality of state management and is designed to coordinate the activities of organs of state power and of the state and pub- lic organizations in defending Russia's national interests and ensuring the security of the indi- vidual, society, and the state.
Russian rul- 57 ers have almost to a man adopted the view that if they could formulate a document or policies that truly imbued the entire state system with a uniform view of its tasks and goals from top to bottom, they could achieve systematic govern- ment in the absence of the rule of law.
Putin and President Medvedev, not to mention their subordinates, are clearly equally susceptible to this delusion, one that apparently remains entrenched in the official mind and ethos of Russia. For centuries Russian rulers have vainly tried to square the circle professing their desire for "regular government" while simultaneously refusing to accept the fact that incoherence and the absence of system are inherent in the nature of their power.
Moreover, this incoherence guarantees their autocratic power. Therefore, any effort by them to preserve that power untouched only reinforces the inherent incoherence of the state, even as they vainly try to impose systematic government by autocratic methods. Certainly an over- view of Putin's defense and institutional reforms un- derscores his aspiration to unify the so called "power vertical" into a single machine functioning to enhance the state's unity and interests and supposedly guar- antee the people's rights even though there is no rule of law or challenge to autocracy.
Consequently, the resulting reality is one of unending policy and personal rivalry behind and often in front of the scenes. The fully elaborated military threat assessment associated with Baluyevsky was outlined by Gareyev at a special con- ference of the academy in January specifically intended to elaborate proposals for the new National Security Concept as it was then called. Gareyev be- gan by complaining about the dearth of competent or- ganizations to work out such a draft, saying there was not one such competent institution in all of Russia.
From the military-political viewpoint the NATO war against Yugoslavia ushered in, in essence, a new epoch not only in the military, but also in the universal his- tory, the epoch of open military-force diktat. Along with the growth of the dependence of its economy on the access to world markets and natural deposits the military-force component of the US policy will be sys- tematically intensifying, including toward Russia ow- ing to the specifics of its geographical position. Instead, it led to specific policy recommenda- tions. Likewise, Russia had to seek to ban the replacement of nuclear warheads with conventional precision warheads on land or sea-based ballistic missiles, and conduct a vigorous foreign policy with the support of the UN, NATO, OSCE, European Union EU , China, India, and other states to overcome America's con- frontational policy, "seeking wherever possible the adoption of international legal norms banning sub- versive activities against other states.
Furthermore, the military and factions aligned to it have won the debate over defining the threats to Rus- sia. In- deed, already in , when speaking of missile de- fenses to the members of the G-8 press corps, Putin basically said that if the military calls it a threat, we agree with that assessment even though it is clear, as Secretary of Defense Gates told him, that he needs new intelligence analysts if he believes that those missile defenses threaten Russia and that Iran is not a threat. Nevertheless, this threat assessment has reigned undisturbed until now de- spite the fact that it is at odds with the emerging force structure of the Russian Army.
And it clearly is a self- serving assessment that reflects not just the folkways of Russia's historic bureaucratic organization but also the dangers inherent in the lack of democratic control over the military and intelligence agencies that allow them to go their own way with dangerous results as Felgenhauer noted above. In other words, careful examination of the new strategy and the debate leading up to it betrays a split personality, particularly as regards the imminence and nature of threats to Russia.
What this episode also shows is that the military's victory on the nature of the threat and policy prescrip- tions to meet it was only possible to the degree that powerful civilian political actors accepted or agreed 61 with its position. Where that is not the case, as in the defense reform, the military can only resort to obstruc- tion, a tactic of dubious value, not least because it has nothing to offer but more of the same. Thus, the gov- ernment professes to have bought the military's threat assessment but has launched a defense reform that points in an entirely different direction than would have been indicated by this acceptance.
So it is not sur- prising that a vicious struggle is currently roiling the entire military establishment. That struggle is continu- ing, attesting to the failure to establish either regular government or democratic and truly civilian control over the armed forces. For instance, we are now told that in the forthcoming defense doctrine, there will be closed or classified sections, specifically those relating to the legal aspects of the army and navy's employ- ment, including the use of nuclear weapons.
Only the military-political sections will be publicized. The earlier move towards concealment represents a hugely regressive step away from both democratic and civilian control, and although the General Staff claims it is only doing what is done in the United States and other Western countries, that is not the case although there are clas- sified annexes to key documents, they are often de- bated or discussed in the chambers of Congress.
But it represented both another attempt to create a kind of Chinese wall behind which the military can shelter 62 itself free of any accountability to anyone, and a fur- ther step towards militarization of state policy along neo-Soviet lines. Thus the debate continues as before. Meanwhile Gareyev's report not only cited the United States as the main threat, but also the prob- lems caused by international terrorism and China's uncertain direction.
He claimed quite in opposition to the facts that as U. Obvi- ously this is a classic vulgar Marxist-Leninist theory that shows just how antediluvian Russian strategic thinking remains. But it has become a central point of Russian threat assessment that found its way into the security strategy and even subsequent articles.
All of this occurs, of course, simultaneously with the cre- ation of Russian thinkers' favorite hobbyhorse, a mul- tipolar world, leading to intense "contradictions" in world politics, to use the Leninist term. Gareyev also attributed to America's leading theorists, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, the ambition to de- stroy Russia, another example of how blinkered this outlook is. Yet even so, because of nuclear weapons, a classical war against Russia is ruled out, although it may occur by other means, and the likelihood of local wars and conflicts increases.
Whereas the main threat is Wash- ington's goal of depriving Russia of its independence, interfering in its internal affairs and infringing on its economic and national interests, the targeting by vari- ous nuclear countries of Russia including NATO, the United States, and China constitutes the second group 63 of threats. The third group of threats is the ambition of other countries again read NATO and the United States to continue the qualitative improvement of weapons towards achieving a dominant military-tech- nical superiority as they approach Russia, and the use of information and information-psychological actions.
The most dangerous of these threats are the separat- ist and terrorist threats directed against Russia's unity and integrity, which as a rule are incited from outside a classic example of Russia's historic refusal to accept its responsibility for its own actions or what goes on in its territory or around its borders. As a result, Russia must counter all these threats through its governmental and defense policies.
Gareyev's threat assessment and recommendations point to several key factors in this debate. First of all, much of this threat assessment is Soviet in origin and thus represents a carry-over of Soviet discourses into a wholly new world without any sense of their obso- lescence, or of their quite visible falsity.
This continu- ity pervades the security establishment. Third, in keeping with this classical Leninist para- noia, threats are ubiquitous, and the internal and external threats are linked since they emanate from the same place. Even where other military writers. This mentality fosters the securitization of virtually every aspect of state policy. Thus the military community presented — and still presents — a compre- hensive and fully thought-out even if reactionary threat assessment, replete with policy recommenda- tions, as its contribution to the ongoing debate over doctrine, policy, etc.
However, this current threat assessment rep- resents some other key aspects of the ongoing debate that have developed over time. Under Putin's and Medvedev's presidencies, debates over Russian se- curity have become, if anything, more acute, with at- tempts being made to securitize ever more aspects of domestic, defense, and foreign policy to justify state supervision over those domains. There seems to be a high degree of continuity between Cold War and post-Cold War Russian interpretations of space-related activities on the Svalbard Archipela- go.
These 'audiences' were gener- ally receptive to the calls for extraordinary measures on and around the archipelago at the time. Indeed, Yeltsin started and Putin completed the process by which so many ex-KGB men have assumed key positions through- out the state for the first time in Russian history. The consequences of that dereliction are fully in evidence today.
This securitization process duly compounds the inherent contradictions of the policy process and the anti-liberal tendencies of Russian politics and is con- nected to the military mentality depicted above. Even if not all of these securitizing moves have succeeded, the scope of the effort, as well as its failures and suc- cesses, are noteworthy. Now they too have been quite overtly securitized in an effort to impose the coordination referred to above. We use this term advisedly, for this "coordination" reflected in Putin's policies and the new strategy are intrinsically anti-democratic and anti-liberal, aiming at the revival of a state power that is unfettered and unaccountable either to law or to other institutions.
Moreover, it is continuing. The draft suggests that the Federal Law On Defence be supplemented with Clause , setting, in accor- dance with Russia's Constitution, the procedures for decisions on use of Russian Armed Forces beyond the country's borders. The new military doctrine, which is being drawn up under the guidance of the Russian Federation Secu- rity Council, will be different from the current text.
His current research includes regional security developments relating to Europe, Eurasia, and East Asia as well as U.
Weitz holds a B. Would you like to tell us about a lower price? If you are a seller for this product, would you like to suggest updates through seller support? Learn more about Amazon Prime. The essays in this volume represent both a memorial and an analytical call to action. These authors and their essays together in memory of our colleague, Mary Fitzgerald of the Hudson Institute, who passed away far too soon, on April 5, Mary was one of the most brilliant and vivacious practitioners of the study of the Russian and Chinese militaries, whose insights helped not just to put those fields of study on the map, but also to influence U.
Other products produced by the U. Army, Strategic Studies Institute can be found here: Read more Read less. Customers who bought this item also bought. Page 1 of 1 Start over Page 1 of 1. The Modern Russian Army — Elite. Sponsored products related to this item What's this? A powerful holocaust memoir that will leave you breathless and heartbroken, yet, inspired and hopeful! How could a young child survive all this? Jonathan Owen identifies the key failings in the US military's current strategy in Afghanistan and lays out a proven strategy for a decisive victory.
Charles Herbert Read Jr. Are you looking for something different on the war at sea? Imagine an eclectic crew, an unfit captain and disaster. Discovering the Power of the Timeless, the Silent, and the In This book introduces anyone newly exposed to Lao Tzu to a wisdom we already know, but seem to have forgotten on the turbulent level of daily living. Architecture of a Technodemocracy: God As Nature Sees God: What can Christians learn from other religions? A comprehensive approach to pornography addiction treatment.
The innovative treatment plan comes at a crucial moment in the fight against pornography. Department of the Army March 1, Language: Related Video Shorts 0 Upload your video. Share your thoughts with other customers. Write a customer review. There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later. Stephen Blank is a strong authority on the military of Modern Russia. Serving as a consultant for the Army War College and on staff at the Strategic Studies Institute, his work in other monographs is well written and thoughtful.
The collection of essays in the Russian Military of Today and Tomorrow is a nice look at the transition from Cold War to the Yeltsin and Putin administrations.
The material is not too old to be obsolete for research and essays on current Russian activities. Publication in makes this text 4 years old but still a good reference on Russian policy. Of course, you can download the text from SSI's website. However, it is good to have the "permanence" of the paperback. This is my second copy because I thought the electronic version would be sufficient. I found that I did not find the convenience of the laptop or ebook to my lifestyle.
Having the digital for reference and the paper for reading works for me. As for the chapters: Is Military Reform in Russia for "Real"? Presence and Absence Over the Last 2 Decades Russian Information Warfare Theory: The Consequence of August Deja Vu All Over Again The Challenge of Understanding the Russian Navy