They appear as originally published except for the correction of obvious mistakes, the interpolation of clarifying material, and the inclusion of new footnotes to indicate Horwich's subsequent directions of thought.
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View or edit your browsing history. As Horwich states in the introduction, these reprinted essays "represent some of my efforts to develop and implement the deflationary outlook and they make a good case, I believe, for its power and fertility" p. As normally understood, the term 'deflationism' denotes a collection of views concerning the notion of truth. Such views aim to deflate more substantial or robust views about truth, such as the correspondence conception, the semantic conception, and various epistemic conceptions the coherence theory, verificationism, and pragmatism. The deflationary conception begins from the appreciation that any analysis of the notion of truth must be constrained by some version of the T-scheme: In itself, this demand is not deflationary.
Rather, it is, as Tarski noted in Der Wahrheitsbegriff , an adequacy condition on a proposed truth definition and indeed this constraint requires careful formulation so as to avoid inconsistency.
Rather, the deflationary thesis is that there is nothing more to the notion of truth than what is stated by the T-scheme. Deflationism is the main theme of the first, second, and fourth essays, "Three Forms of Realism" , "Realism and Truth" , and "Meaning, Use and Truth" I shall return to this group of essays at the end. The former essay develops a position Horwich calls Global Conventionalism a position similar to what is known as Conceptual Role Semantics. Horwich analyses the notion of the conceptual role of a theoretical predicate via the theory's Ramsey sentence after the logician Frank Ramsey; converting a theory formulation to its Ramsey sentence is sometimes called ramsification.
I found Horwich's line of argument here somewhat hard to follow, but it seems to be that the correct representation of the content of a scientific theory T is given by its Ramsey sentence R T. Our fundamental thesis is that, if S 1 is our total theory-formulation, then we know a priori that, if a Ramsey sentence derived from S 1 is true, then S 1 is true -- that is,. Proposals to analyse theoretical content in terms of Ramsey sentences have a long history Ramsey, Carnap, Maxwell, Lewis and others , and have been advanced by several recent "structural realists", such as Worrall, Zahar, and Redhead.
In my view, the major problem with any such conceptual-role view of the semantics of theoretical terms is the "Newman Problem", identified by M. Newman in a Mind review of Russell's Analysis of Matter , where Russell had presented a structuralist account of knowledge claims.
Thus we have another dimension along which deflationary theories can vary. From an investor's point of view, companies that accumulate large cash reserves or that have relatively little debt are more attractive under deflation. For the propositionalist, in other words, instances of the equivalence schema are properly interpreted not as being about sentences but about propositions, i. Well, in one sense, they do: But the relata in 10 are obviously not distinct. To be more precise, the suggestion is that someone has the concept of truth just in case he or she is disposed to accept all noncontroversial instances of the equivalence schema, i.
Structural knowledge claims are Ramsey sentences. Newman criticized this view on the grounds that such structural knowledge claims about the external world are, if satisfiable at all, mathematically equivalent to claims about the cardinality of the domain D. More generally, if only theoretical predicates are ramsified and the second-order quantifiers are given their standard semantics, then it can be shown that the truth of a Ramsey sentence R T is equivalent to T's possessing an empirically correct model of the right size see William Demopoulos, "On the Rational Reconstruction of our Theoretical Knowledge" and Jeffrey Ketland, "Empirical Adequacy and Ramsification" , both in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Thus someone who asserts R T is asserting little more than that the theory T is empirically adequate its observational consequences are all true. So, Horwich's view collapses to an instrumentalist view of theory acceptance, similar to van Fraassen's. Ironically, this is precisely what Horwich intends to avoid. There is more work to be done clarifying this matter. The most obvious proposal insists that second-order variables appearing in Ramsey sentences must be taken to range over only some special collection of real properties and relations.
Of course, this requires an independent explanation of what distinguishes these "real" relations from the "artificial" ones. The fifth essay, "The Nature and Norms of Theoretical Commitment" , is an interesting argument against scientific instrumentalism, van Fraassen-style.
The instrumentalist insists upon a distinction between accepting a theory and believing it.
If a theory has the appropriate epistemic credentials, the instrumentalist recommends only acceptance, while demurring from belief. Bas van Fraassen in The Scientific Image argued that observable empirical support can only ever warrant acceptance of a theory i. Most realists accept the distinction in some form or another, but argue that belief in a theory's approximate truth is often justified usually by a no-miracles argument of some sort.
Horwich's aim in his essay is to argue that the very distinction between belief and acceptance cannot be maintained: According to van Fraassen's characterization of the instrumentalist's posture, acceptance consists in believing just the observable consequences of a theory including those observation statements that derive from the theory in conjunction with other accepted theories , and using the theory to make predictions, give explanations without being committed to their truth , and design experiments.
No wonder Vaihinger called this the philosophy of 'as if'.
For these are precisely the things that a believer would do. Yet it is suggested that we might accept our theories without believing them! This is a distinction without a difference pp. For good or ill, there is a whiff of behaviourism about this argument. Horwich goes on to argue that a psychological theory would characterise beliefs "as states with a particular causal role" which would "consist in such features as generating predictions, prompting certain utterances, being caused by certain observations, entering in characteristic ways into inferential relations …" and concludes "but that is to define belief in exactly the way instrumentalists characterise acceptance" p.
This is an empirical indistinguishability argument: This may be true, but it does not establish the identity of belief and acceptance unless one adds the behaviourist premise that beliefs should be defined in terms of behaviour. So, I am not sure that Horwich makes a good case for identifying belief and acceptance.
But I suspect that arguments like this lend credence to the conclusion that the boundary between acceptance and belief is fuzzier that those who urge instrumentalism would care to admit. The sixth essay "Wittgensteinian Bayesianism" is a standard account of the Bayesian approach to epistemology and scientific method. The seventh essay "Deflating the Direction of Time" is a short review of J. Lucas, The Future Lucas there defended the common-sense idea of a moving NOW, which trichotomizes events into the absolute past, present, and future.
On this view, the spatio-temporal structure of the universe, represented in our best physical theories as a manifold with a metric, does not involve a special moving NOW; indeed, attempting to add such a feature faces severe problems. Horwich's article is well-argued, and makes a good case against the moving NOW view. A Theory of Normative Judgement Horwich aims to blend his own deflationism with Gibbard's expressivism.
Horwich argues that meta-normative questions concerning the factuality of normative claims can be deflated by insisting on the equivalence of "it is a fact that p " and " p ". Horwich concludes that expressivists have no need to claim that normative assertions do not express facts, or are not true, or do not attribute properties: Norm-expressivism has no need for these theses and would be better off without them.
Its real substance lies in a distinctive semantic view of the indirect way in which the term 'rational' is defined namely, that the meaning of 'rational' is specified implicitly by means of an explicit definition of ' Y believes that x is rational' , and a distinctive metaphysical claim about the non-explanatory nature of normative facts namely, that beliefs about what is rational are not consequences of what is in fact rational.
I find little to recommend in all this. Presumably, the phenomenon of rationality is inseparable from truth-seeking, valid reasoning, and assigning probabilities coherently, in relation to evidence.